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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Comment on Recent Decisions
BILLS AND NOTES-HoLDER IN DuE Cous--NoTIcE or THEFT.-An at-
tempt by the courts to construe Sections 52 and 56 of the Uniform Negoti-
able Instruments Law1 so as to conform to decisions prior to its adoption has
resulted in an incorrect interpretation of these sections. Thus, in Graham v.
White Phillips Company (1935) 56 S. Ct. 21, 296 U. S. 27, the plaintiff
sought to recover negotiable bonds stolen from him and sold to defendant
at a fair price in the ordinary course of its business. Defendant contended
it was a holder in due course, and therefore that it took free from such
defects in title. Three days after the theft plaintiff had caused printed
notice thereof to be sent to bond dealers, including defendant. Because of
defendant's negligence in dissemination of this information to its employees,
the defendant later purchased these bonds without any recollected knowl-
edge of the theft. Before the purchase defendant made no inquiry except
as to the status of the vendor. The Supreme Court of the United States,
supporting defendant's contention, held that one who purchases a stolen
negotiable bond in good faith before maturity, for a valuable consideration,
may be a holder in due course despite the fact that notice of the theft had
previously come to him, if through forgetfulness or neglilence, he did not
have it in mind when purchasing.
Lord v. Wilkinson,2 the early leading case in point, relied on other cases
decided before the present codification of the law of negotiable instruments.
In the Lord Case, the Court of Appeals held that an instruction that "the
defendants once having had notice, are bound by it, although the notice
may have been forgotten" was incorrect, and said that bona fides must be
judged as of the defendant's knowledge at the time of purchase, and that
while a presumption of mala fides arises from prior notice, such is re-
buttable by proof that notice was lost, or its existence and contents for-
gotten.
This doctrine is approved by dicta in other cases. In Merchants National
Bank v. Detroit Trust Company3 the facts were identical with the Graham
Case, except that the purchaser testified that notice was not actually re-
ceived, but the court said that assuming that notice of the theft had actually
been received, if the purchaser later forgot about it or carelessly mislaid
it "so that it was not in their minds at the time' they acquired the bonds"
the purchaser's title as holder in due course would be unaffected. In
1 N. I. L. Sec. 52: "A holder in due course is a holder who has taken
the instrument under the following conditions: . . . 4. That at the time it
was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument
or defect in the title of the person negotiating it." Sec. 56: "To constitue
notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had
actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that
his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith."
2 (1870) 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 593. New York passed the N. I. L. in 1897.
A (1932) 258 Mich. 526, 242 N. W. 739.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Vermilye v. Adams Express Company,4 easily distinguishable from the
Graham Case in that the bonds were purchased after maturity, the Supreme
Court held that bankers have the duty to keep a book or other form of
reference in which to preserve notices when received, which must be con-
sulted before buying overdue negotiable paper, but "by the well established
fule of the cases they may purchase such paper before due without cumber-
ing their minds or their offices with the memoranda of such notices."
In other cases are found statements that the knowledge of a defect in
title will prevent a purchaser from being a holder in due course only when
such knowledge was had at the time of the purchase. But in these cases
the courts were not thinking of notice not recollected at the time of pur-
chase, but were distinguishing cases in which the purchaser had notice
before or at the time of purchase from cases in which the purchaser re-
ceived notice after the purchase.
These cases all seem to overlook the fact that the N. I. L. provides that
either bad faith or notice of defects in title may prevent the purchaser
from becoming a holder in due course. They say that although the pur-
chaser may have had notice, he was not acting in bad faith because he
had forgotten all about the notice, even though the failure of memory was
caused by negligence of the purchaser himself; and, furthermore, that even
gross negligence is not conclusive of bad faith, but only evidence thereof,
and may be rebutted by a clear showing that the purchaser actually had
forgotten the notice. 6 This may be true, but by the N. I. L. the purchaser's
notice alone would seem to prevent him from being a holder in due course,
although he may have acted in good faith.
The better view is upheld in only one case, Northwestern National Bank
v. Madison and Kedzie State Bank,7 which arose in the same state as the
Graham Case, Illinois. Here a notice of theft of bonds was mailed to one
who became a subsequent purchaser in good faith before maturity. The
notice, it was proved, was actually received by the mailing clerk. The
Court of Appeals held that if the mailing clerk of the purchaser had
authority to open the mail, the clerk's knowledge was imputed to the princi-
pal whether such knowledge was remembered at the time of purchose or not.
The court correctly pointed out that the N. I. L. does not qualify the rule
of notice with exceptions for forgotten or overlooked notices, and that the
4 (1875) 21 Wall. 138, 22 L. Ed. 609.
5 Goodman v. Simonds (1857) 20 How. 343, 15 L. Ed. 934, 941; Mechanics
American National Bank v. Helmbacher (1918) 199 Mo. App. 173, 201
S. W. 383; First National Bank v. Pennington (1899) 57 Neb. 404, 77 N. W.
1084; Mills v. Hayden (1924) 128 Wash. 67, 221 Pac. 994, 34 A. L. R. 1372.
6 Originally gross negligence was conclusively presumptive of bad faith.
Crook v. Jadis (1833) 5 Barn. and Ad. 909. But today this presumption is
rebuttable. Goodman v. Harvey (1835) 4 A. & E. 870; Hall v. Wilson
(1853) 16 Barb. 551; Phelan v. Moss (1870) 67 Pa. 59; Mayes v. Robinson
(1887) 93 Mo. 114, 5 S. W. 611; Chapman v. Rose (1874) 56 N. Y. 137,
15 Am. Rep. 401. See also 2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments (7th ed.)
sec. 892 and cases cited in notes to 8 C. J. 503.
7 (1926) 242 Ill. App. 22.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol21/iss2/11
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
purchaser bank, although it may have acted in good faith at the time of
purchase, could not be a holder in due course because it had been given
notice prior to purchase.
The Supreme Court of the United States, referring to the Illinois Appeals
case, said:8 "The State Supreme Court denied an application for certiorari
without more. The argument is that this amounted to approval of the con-
struction placed upon the statute by the Appeals Court. The point is not
well taken." Although the Supreme Court of the United States may not
have been bound by the Northwestern Natiowl Bank Case as was thus
explained, it is to be regretted that the latter case was not followed as
stating the better doctrine. J. C. L. '36
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-JOHNSON AcT.-The Federal District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma had taken jurisdiction of a suit by Cary,
a trustee of the Consolidated Gas Company, seeking an interlocutory injunc-
tion against the enforcement of reduced rates ordered by the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission, and that court, sitting with three judges, had
granted the injunction prayed for.' On appeal, the Supreme Court of the
United States per curiam affirmed the decision. Held that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion; that, in view of the uncertainty pro-
duced by "diametrically opposed" decisions of the state courts2 as to the
availability of judicial review to one contesting an order of the Corpora-
tion Commission in the state courts, and in view of certain provisions of the
Oklahoma constitution,3 there was no "plain, speedy, and efficient" state
remedy as contemplated by the Johnson Act 4 and hence the District Court
was not deprived of its jurisdiction.5
The Johnson Act, passed by Congress on May 14, 1934, after prolonged
debate,6 was designed to eliminate unnecessary interference by the Federal
8 Graham v. White-Pillips Co., supra, 1. c. 30.
'Cary v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma et al. (1935) 9 F. Supp.
709.
2 Swain v. Oklahoma Ry. Co. (1934) 168 Old. 133, 32 P. (2nd) 51;
Pioneer Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. State (1914) 40 Okl. 417, 138 P.
(2nd) 1033.
8 Article 9, Sections 20, 22, 23, Oklahoma Constitution.
4 48 Stat. 775, 28 U. S. C. 41 (1). "An act to amend Section 24 of the
Judicial Code." (Senate Bill No. 752.) It provides: no District Court shall
have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of an order of an administra-
tive board or commission of a State, "where jurisdiction is based solely upon
the ground of diversity of citizenship, or the repugnance of such order to
the Constitution of the United States, where such order (1) affects rates
chargeable by a public utility, (2) does not interfere with interstate com-
merce, and (3) has been made after reasonable notice and hearing, and
where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity
in the courts of such state."
5 Corporation Commission of Oklahoma et al. v. Cary (Dec. 23, 1935)
56 S. Ct. 300.
6 (a) In the Senate, 78 Cong. Rec. (Part 2) 1915-1920, 2014-2024, 2238-
2243; (b) In the House, 78 Cong. Reec. (Part 8) 8322-8351, 8415-8433. (c)
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